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Malpractice in the United Kingdom
R. Bryce.Smith*
N o LAW EXISTS which precisely determines the liability of a
medical practitioner in respect of his patients. However,
the basis of a practitioner's responsibility is that he should "ex-
ercise a reasonable degree of skill and care." As Purchase says,
there is no statutory backing for this operative phrase, but it has
received sufficient usage to merit its continuance.' The principle
was first evoked in the case of Lanphier v. Phipos (1838) 2 and
it is obvious that in the absence of any more exact requirements,
considerable latitude exists. Gradually, various decisions of the
courts have limited the field of responsibility, and indicated to
some extent what is meant by "reasonable skill and care." With
the exception of these modifications, the law has not changed
materially for over a century, but at the present time, there is an
undoubted increase in the frequency with which actions involv-
ing doctors and hospital authorities appear before the courts. The
two most obvious factors influencing this tendency are the in-
troduction of the National Health Service in 1948, and the Legal
Aid and Advice Act of 1949. The former removes in part in-
dividual responsibility, while the latter opens the door of the
courts to those of limited financial means who might otherwise
have been reluctant to risk an expensive legal action.
In an action for damages, the burden of proof rests primarily
on the plaintiff. An exception to this general rule is encountered
when the injury suffered may be assumed to be the result of the
defendant's negligence when no reasonable alternative explana-
tion can be given. In the case of Cassidy v. Ministry of Health,
(1951), the plaintiff in effect said, "I went into hospital to be
cured of two stiff fingers. I have come out with four stiff fingers
and my hand is useless. This should not have happened if due
care had been used. Explain it if you can." 3 Nevertheless, it
would appear that the courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, on which, if there were too rigid reliance,
grave injustices might result. Thus more and more, insistence
* M.A., D.M., F.F.A.R.C.S.; Consultant Anaesthetist, United Oxford Hos-
pitals, Nuffield Dept. of Anaesthetics, Radcliffe Infirmary, Oxford, England.
1 Purchase, B., 1946, Jervis on Coroners, 8th ed., London, p. 58.
2 Lanphier v. Phipos, 1838, All E. R. 171.
3 Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, 1 All E. R. 574.
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on proof of negligence is required. Any liability for negligence
arises out of tort, being regarded as a breach of duty fixed by
law requiring reasonable skill and care. It may be assumed that
when a practitioner undertakes to treat a patient, a contractual
relationship is established in which an assurance is implicit that
skill and care will be provided. If an action is brought on the
grounds of negligence this may amount to breach of duty, breach
of contract, or both. It must however be proved that damage
has resulted from the incident complained of. It is not sufficient
merely to show that the defendant was negligent.
Such negligence is usually of a civil nature and may be an
act of omission or commission. Negligence has been defined as
"The omission to do something which a reasonable man guided
upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do," (Blyth v. Birmingham Water
Works Company, 1856.) 4 Alternatively, and certainly more
briefly, this may be translated as "neglect of some care which
we are bound by law to exercise towards somebody else" (Thomas
v. Quatermaine).5 A charge of criminal negligence may be pre-
ferred only when the consequences of negligence exceed that
which may be a matter of compensation. Indeed it implies such
a disregard for life and safety as to amount to a crime against the
state and therefore deserving of punishment.
Specialists
Participation in a specialty in no way alters the basic
principles already mentioned. But a practitioner who describes
himself as a specialist, whether he has suitable qualifications or
not, immediately raises the standard of skill and knowledge
which he is expected to possess. This in itself demonstrates that
"reasonable skill and care" is on a sliding scale to be related to
the experience, qualifications, position and status of each doctor.
It will also be influenced by circumstances, and what may be
required in the standard of treatment in a teaching hospital will
not be expected in a small country infirmary, in a road accident
or other emergency. The standard required is therefore that of
any prudent doctor of similar status, working in similar circum-
stances, and at the same time. This last point is important, since
4 Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Company, 11 Ex. 781.
5 Thomas v. Quatermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685.
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during the interval between an injury and the hearing of a case,
medical knowledge may have increased. This very point was
referred to in the now celebrated case of Woolley and Roe v.
Ministry of Health and others.( The medical details of this case
have been described fully,7 but briefly, two patients receiving
spinal anaesthesia on the same afternoon developed paralysis
from the waist down. It was held that this accident resulted
from phenol percolating through fine cracks in the ampoules of
local anaesthetic solution. The common practice at that time was
to sterilize ampoules by immersion in a disinfectant solution. The
action for damages was not heard until 1951 by which time
sterilization by autoclaving had become accepted practice. The
judge in summing up said: "Having regard to the standard of
knowledge to be imputed to competent anaesthetists in 1947, the
anaesthetist could not be found guilty of negligence in having
failed to appreciate the risk of the phenol percolating through
molecular flaws in the glass ampoules and contaminating the
Nupercaine." It will be appreciated that had an error of tech-
nique been proved, the judgment might have been very dif-
ferent. In the case of Voller v. Portsmouth Corporation and
others,8 a boy with a broken leg was administered a spinal
anaesthetic for manipulation of the fracture. Meningitis de-
veloped and paralysis ensued. It was proved that this accident
resulted from inadequate or improper sterilization of the instru-
ments used for the spinal anaesthetic and the hospital staff, for
whom the Corporation were legally responsible, were held to
blame.
It will be appreciated too that no serious criticism of the
method of anaesthesia was made in the case of Woolley and Roe.
This is in accordance with the freedom of choice of suitable treat-
ment accorded to every doctor. The fact that another practitioner
may have treated a patient differently is not regarded as neg-
ligence. It may however fall to the lot of the defendant to ex-
plain, or even justify, his choice of treatment. This rarely pre-
sents any difficulty provided the methods used are generally ac-
cepted. Although a medical or dental practitioner has a duty
to use reasonable skill and care, he does not guarantee success-
ful treatment any more than a lawyer guarantees to win a client's
6 Woolley and Roe v. Ministry of Health and others, 1 W. L. 685.
7 Cope, R. W., 1954, Anaesthesia, 9, 249.
8 Voller v. Portsmouth Corporation, The Times, 1947, April 30th.
Jan., 1961
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case. He is not responsible for an accident which could not
reasonably have been foreseen. What is negligence and what is
accident will still have to be decided in the light of the particular
facts established in evidence.9 Again, when the appeal of Woolley
and Roe was heard, Lord Justice Denning said that, "doctors
might be led to think more of their own safety than of the good
of their patients. Initiative would be stifled and confidence
shaken. We must insist on due care for the patients, but we
must not condemn as negligence that which is only misadven-
ture."
Less clear is the opinion as to what constitutes adequate
knowledge, particularly in the case of a specialist. In the case of
Crawford v. Board of Governors of Charing Cross Hospital,10
the plaintiff sought damages for a brachial plexus palsy resulting
from abduction of the arm for the purpose of a blood transfusion
during the course of anaesthesia. Since an article had appeared
in the Lancet a few months earlier pointing out this danger, the
trial judge held that the anaesthetist (of consultant status) was
liable, and implied that failure to keep abreast of literature in
professional journals amounted to negligence. Happily for many
doctors this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal when
the judge stated: "It would be putting too high a burden on
medical men to say that they must read every article in the
medical press." Yet differences of opinion exist, both in the legal
and medical mind, for a few months earlier damages were
awarded in a very similar case. Here, the anaesthetist, also of
consultant status, abducted the arm in order to give an injection
of curare, and a palsy later developed.
Anaesthetics
There is no difference between anaesthesia and other special-
ties, but it is assumed that all practitioners have received some
training in the administration of anaesthetics, and should therefore
exhibit a minimum degree of competence. Equally, a practitioner
is in no way bound to attempt or undertake an anaesthetic pro-
cedure which he feels is beyond his powers. Should he do so,
he becomes responsible for the consequences, which may be
difficult to justify if the practitioner failed to summon help from
9 Lancet, 1953, 2, 996.
10 Crawford v. Board of Governors, Charing Cross Hospital, The Times,
1953, Dec. 8th.
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a more skilled person-assuming that such a person was avail-
able. Curiously enough the law does not require that the ad-
ministration of an anaesthetic should be by a medically qualified
person. This point aroused considerable interest in the past, and
early in this century, Hewitt strove to make anaesthesia by un-
qualified persons a statutory offence. An Anaesthetics Bill was
drafted as a result of his actions but the First World War was
responsible for preventing his aims being passed in law, and no
further action has ever been taken."
It is made clear 12 that it is in the anaesthetist's best interests
to observe the following points:
1. Written consent to the anaesthetic must be obtained. Con-
sent to operation does not necessarily imply consent to anaes-
thesia, and failure to observe this formality could lead to a
charge of assault. Consent can only be given by a person over the
age of 21, otherwise the form of consent must be signed by a
parent or guardian, except where undue delay in obtaining this
might be hazardous to life.
2. The administrator should examine the patient to decide
for himself the suitability of the patient for the intended pro-
cedure.
3. The anaesthetist must check personally drugs, fluids, and
apparatus.
4. Every precaution must be taken to prevent fire and ex-
plosion especially where diathermy is being used.
5. Vigilance must not be relaxed until the patient is suf-
ficiently recovered from the effects of the anaesthetic to be left
safely in the care of the nursing staff.
To this list must be added the advisability of having a third
person present during the administration. Indeed in the older
text books this was often the most strongly worded piece of ad-
vice to the young practitioner. It is obvious that this is a com-
mon-sense precaution, not only to obviate any possible claims of
improper assault, but to safeguard the patient should the
anaesthetist experience trouble and need help.
Legally it is not the responsibility of the anaesthetist to de-
termine which tooth is to be removed, or whether the right or
11 Blomfield, J., 1927, Brit. J. Anaesth., 4, 118.
12 Smith S. and Simpson K., 1957, Taylor's Principles and Practice of
Medical Jurisprudence, 11th ed. London, Vol. I, p. 72.
Jan., 1961
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left organ or limb is to be operated upon. But failure to do so be-
fore starting the anaesthetic is likely to lead to strong criticism
should an error be made. In the same way, the anaesthetist must
take an interest in all matters relating to the patient's well being
and safety. Morally, at least, he must take whatever steps he
considers necessary to prevent nerve injuries due to faulty
posturing, burns from diathermy or other electrical apparatus,
etc.
Doubts may be felt when a surgeon demands a particular
type of anaesthetic and when his choice is not in accordance with
those of the anaesthetist. As Mushin quite clearly states,13 such
differences of opinion should be cleared up by a preliminary dis-
cussion since the operating room is not the place for a heated
argument. He continues, "There is no doubt that in the eyes of
the law, the anaesthetist is responsible for what he does himself."
A surgeon's views are always worthy of a respect since he is re-
sponsible for the general well being of his patient throughout
the treatment of disease. However, if after preliminary discus-
sion the difference of opinion is not solved, this should be re-
corded in the notes and it should hardly ever be necessary for
an anaesthetist to refuse to give an anaesthetic on these grounds
since inevitably the patient will suffer in consequence. On the
other hand, Helme 14 believes that it is unwise for an anaesthetist
to adopt a technique which in his opinion might be injurious to
the patient, even dispite the fact that this may be contrary to
the surgeon's wishes and choice. There is an abundance of evi-
dence to support this latter thesis, and it will be assumed that
provided the anaesthetist is suitably trained he is ultimately re-
sponsible for his actions since he is likely to be in a better posi-
tion to select the most suitable technique.' 5 This view is also
held by the Ministry of Health who make it clear that they be-
lieve that neither dentist nor surgeon should be held responsible
for what the anaesthetist does or does not do.16
Thus it is quite obvious that the anaesthetist's responsibility
is heavy and is undoubtedly growing. Such a responsibility is
not peculiar to the United Kingdom alone and Whitacre 7 re-
13 Mushin, W. W., 1954, Anaesthesia, 9, 232.
14 Helme, J. M., 1949, Proc. R. Soc. Med. 42, 705.
16 Lancet, 1953, 2, 1080.
16 Lancet, 1953, 2, 728.
17 Whitacre, R. J., 1953, J. Amer. Med. Ass., 147, 1511.
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marks that this is due to (1) an increase in the number of
elective operations performed on good risk patients, (2) an in-
crease in the number of complex and difficult operations which
are to a large extent dependent on a carefully conducted anes-
thetic, and (3) an increase in the number of operations per-
formed on poor risk patients. To this list must be added the
advent of special techniques such as hypotension or hypothermia
designed to make certain operations possible, or to assist the
surgeon in the conduct of highly skilled procedures, the success
of which depend almost exclusively on the judgment and skill
of the anaesthetist.
Responsibility
It is a general rule of law that a wrong-doer is directly re-
sponsible for the results of his own wrongful acts.18 This principle
held until 1942 when a doctor in hospital practice was regarded
as being in the position of an independent contractor. This is
different from an industrial employee employed in a contract of
service for whose mistakes the employer is responsible. Classi-
cally this division between professional and administrative duties
was laid down in the case of Hillyer v. Governors of St. Bartho-
lomew's Hospital in 1909.19 Gradually this view has changed, and
even before the appointed day on which the National Health
Service came into being, it became accepted that a doctor em-
ployed in a hospital, and remunerated for his services, was in
fact and in law, a servant of the hospital authority who must
accept liability for the negligence of such an employee. This
opinion was finally and clearly set out by Lord Justice Denning
in the case of Cassidy v. Ministry of Health already referred to.
This decision was however qualified by the terms under which
the doctor was employed. Thus if a patient selects and employs
a doctor to carry out his treatment, the hospital is not responsible.
If on the other hand, the doctor, no matter what his rank, is em-
ployed by a hospital authority and is not remunerated for his
services by the patient, then they (the Hospital authorities) will
be held liable.
In a case of negligence, it is almost certain that action will be
taken jointly against the hospital authority and the doctor or doc-
tors concerned. But the degree of responsibility will often be
18 Mair. W., 1954, Anaesthesia, 9, 242.
19 Hillyer v. Board of Governors, St. Bartholomew's Hospital, 2 K. B. 820.
Jan., 1961
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adjudged depending on the relative competence of the doctors.
Thus if an hospital authority employs a junior and inexperienced
medical officer as an anaesthetist to work without proper super-
vision and help, then it is likely that the hospital authority will be
held entirely responsible for any untoward consequences. To
quote Mr. Justice Oliver in a recent case in which a newly quali-
fied medical officer administered thiopentone, and as a result of
which the patient died, "The Hospital authorities are one hundred
per cent responsible in this case. To put a weapon of this sort
within the reach of a girl who had been qualified for only five
months and expect her to handle it with sufficient knowledge and
to watch the patient, is simply asking for trouble." 20 Certainly
the anaesthetist was held to be negligent in this case and lacking
in proper training and skill, but it was considered to be the fault
of the Hospital Board which employed such a person in such a
type of work that was held to be directly responsible. Mr.
Justice Oliver continued, "For many years now, about thirty to
forty, anaesthetics have been regarded as a special branch of the
profession. It is a fact that to anaesthetise a human being, to de-
prive him of consciousness outright, is to take a considerable step
along the road to killing him; but, of course, when the matter
is scientifically handled by experienced people, practically no
danger exists. To allow inexperienced people to practice this
art without supervision is obviously a very serious thing to do.
I am not at present saying it is wrong; I am saying it is very
serious and it has got to be approached in that spirit."
These cases have undoubtedly made it clear what the legal
attitude towards responsibility is in the case of junior medical
officers employed by a hospital or other authority. Where a more
senior person is involved, it is likely that the burden of responsi-
bility will be shifted so that it is more equally borne by the
practitioner and the employing authority, certainly in the matter
of compensation.
Coroners
Deaths occurring on the operating table or during the im-
mediate post-operative period during which the patient does not
recover consciousness from the anaesthetic, must be reported to
the coroner, who will almost invariably order an autopsy. At his
own discretion he may or may not order a full inquest. One of
20 Jones v. Manchester Corporation, 1952, 2 All E. R., 125.
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the main objects of this procedure is to inquire publicly into the
cause of death, and to allow relatives or friends of the deceased
person to be satisfied that death was unavoidable. In some in-
stances, it will appear that criticism of a practitioner is imputed.
The practitioner may, under these circumstances, refuse to answer
further questions until he is legally represented.
A proper understanding of the circumstances as a result of a
public inquiry can do much to avoid surreptitious criticism
(which is unanswerable and may damage a practitioner's repu-
tation), and often prevent unnecessary litigation. These courts
thus serve to protect not only the general public but the prac-
titioner as well.
The general public is to-day very much better educated than
it used to be, and more aware of its rights. The increased facili-
ties for undertaking litigation at a time when medicine as a
whole, and anaesthesia in particular, is broadening its fields and
developing new techniques, undoubtedly leads to an increase in
the number of legal actions against the practitioner and may lead
to an attitude of "let's have a go"! The courts however recognise
this and have attempted to prevent limitation of procedures and
treatment by practitioners which might result from a fear of the
legal consequences. Nevertheless every doctor is advised to join
a defence society, and indeed such a membership is now a condi-
tion of employment within the hospital service.
A further, though perhaps incidental, consequence has been
an improvement in the standards of case histories and record
keeping. Failure to maintain adequate notes will place a defend-
ant in a most difficult position, and alone may lead to an un-
favorable judgment. Yet, if a practitioner performs his work to
the best of his ability with reasonable conscientiousness, he will
assuredly maintain a standard of "reasonable skill and care" and
need have little fear of legal actions.
Jan., 1961
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